India’s Role in a Changing Afghanistan by Shashank Joshi. The Washington Quartely 37:2, 87-102

This is a newspaper and media evidence rich analysis of India’s thinking on the draw down of US troops and the development of political resolutions in Afghanistan.

It begins by outlining that India has thought the reluctance to cross over the border into Pakistan was ‘botched’ and the US have ‘subcontracted’ peace to the ISI.

Joshi says India feel threatened by the local political solutions being discussed and see it as ‘a euphemism for Taliban dominance in parts of Afghanistan’

It seems India and the US have lots in common, they both fully support ANSF efforts to impose control and the US should consider more support of Indian efforts in this regard as it begins to draw down. Joshi explains that concomitantly, the US should persuade the new Modi government to involve the Taliban is discussions. Joshi makes a good point here that India probably make the error of thinking the Taliban are Pakistan ISI. In reality the Haqquani network are probably more affiliated to ISI and the modern day Taliban are more independent of the old guard.

The most useful contribution this article makes is the thoughts on how India should see the Taliban office in Doha. While it does legitimise the group somewhat it also distances them from ISI and Pakistan, something New Delhi should be pleased off.

Suggestions for India include ramping up the 500 or so troops India train and somehow stem the 5000 per month attrition rate in the ANSF. With Indian experience in counter insurgency and dealings with terrorism the replacements they train maybe good for the security of India and Afghanistan. Pakistan seem comfortable with this idea and would, over time install Indian culture and practices in the ANSF.

All in all this tight production of 15 pages is very useful. It present the idea of India accepting the Doha office as a step away from ISI influence very convincingly and makes good suggestions for India’s role in training troops for the ANSF.

A summary of ‘Americas coming War with China’ (2005) by Ted Galen Carpenter.

Americas coming War with China (2005) by Ted Galen Carpenter. Palgrave Publishing

This summary is intended for those looking at International Security, China, US foreign policy and history. Carpenter begins with a future imaginary war between the US and China over Taiwan. The picture he paints is vivid and seemingly generated by a love of narrative and fiction. It is not until the subsequent chapters and Carpenters conclusion that we see that the imaginary war is in fact a result of his research and is more of a prophesy.

The future war begins with Taiwan’s independence rhetoric delivered through its media and the call by the president to change the state’s official name from Republic of China. The PRC then ramp up the action to reclaim Taiwan and cause the US to send aircraft carriers into the strait between the two states. China begins to take offence and after years of developing its own military to deal with the issue of Taiwan bombs the US naval presence. After airstrikes by USAF on the Chinese mainland the issue of Nuclear weapons raises its head and the war calms down to the point where Taiwan become part of China again, the US is humiliated militarily and economically after Chinese shedding of US bonds. Pages 1-25

At this point it may be right to scoff but after careful reading of the ensuing chapters Carpenter presents a good case for this being a decent stab at what might happen. Carpenter begins by laying the blame in the hands of the Chinese and colonial expansion in general. In 1895 A war between China and Japan over Korea resulted in Taiwan been given to Japan after Chinese defeat. Taiwan (already showing an independent streak) declared independence and made it a Japanese police state. Despite the occupation or may be because of it Taiwan developed a new culture and became a very different place to mainland China in 1943.

This became todays problem when Churchill and Roosevelt divvied up ex Japanese land and gave Taiwan to the Chinese after a Cairo conference. Here lyeth the problem. The US created their own problem. The ‘rough landing’ Page 34 China made on Taiwan upset locals and felt the hard work of developing a strong economy and industry was undone. Further local upset was caused by the nationalists using Taiwan as a base during the war with Mao in 1949.

Previous to the Cairo treaty Churchill and the US president decides on Mao had stated that he did not consider Taiwan ‘lost territory’ Page 37 But the two western leaders legitimised Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan in Cairo. This confuses things today.

During the Korean War in the 50’s Truman sent Aircraft carriers to the area and there was thinking that the US should use Nuclear weapons on mainland China to make the nationalists on Taiwan more able to reclaim what the communists had taken. In fact Eisenhower asked why ‘’Nuclear weapons shouldn’t be used exactly as you would a bullet’’ Page 43

In the 60’s JFK changed stance to recognise PRC as official China. This was however just a way of stoking up Chinese anti USSR feelings. This was clever by the US and Kissinger as the US strategy was to use Chinese war theorist Sun Tze’s philosophy and engage in war by causing friction with your enemies alliances.

In 1979 the US agreed to sell arms to Taiwan and including high tech fighter aircraft in 1981. Concomitantly, Chinese-US relations also improved due to Deng Xiapings modernisation and the need for China to import to develop.

Taiwan replied by democratising the country in order to win over US congressional support. Whatever the impact Bush Snr sold 150 top of the range jets to Taiwan in 1992. This could have been due to the fact Bush Snr was fighting an election and need the votes a big defence contract would bring. (he lost anyway) This gave Taiwan the confidence to court relationships with other nations which incensed China. 150,000 troops moved to Fujian province just over the water and after renewed US naval presence a further arms deal was signed including Attack Submarines. Page 71

Today the US want to trade with China and support democracy in Taiwan. A tricky situation. Any strategic ambiguity was cleared up by Bush Jrn in 2001 when he said ‘’we will defend Taiwan’’ Page 127.

All changed after 9/11 when China was needed by the US to reign in North Korea and assist with pressuring Pakistan and Central Asia to cooperate with dealing with terrorism.

In 2004 however the rise of China turned the tables. China now had the ability to take Taiwan. Reports and Think Tanks saw that 700+ Ballistic missiles were trained on Taiwanese economic hubs. The issue remained that Taiwan had decent air defence and only 20% of shoreline useful for amphibious assault. Page 153

The tipping point would be the introduction of a blockade that would result in Chinese submarine being hunted by depth charges. This would lead to an open naval warfare that would see China now superior Navy win out.

All this may seem as hypothetical as the initial chapter but is borne out by reliable intelligence and research. This was all thought through in 2005 and then said it would take 10 years for China to develop the amphibious hardware to invade or more of the same naval power to win any naval warfare brought about by a blockade.

The book, although depressing does show the kind of way China has been strategically moving to ensure a successful war over Taiwan and warns the west over interfering in sovereignty issues. It encourages us to find a peaceful end to the ‘one china’ dispute and perhaps the west should explain to Taiwan it would need to defend itself in the future and stay out of this affair. It seems inevitable that Taiwan will return to mainland control and other states in the area should not antagonise China into a war it cannot win (I.e Japan and the Diayou Islands)

How UN self indulgence on North Korea could lead to a Sino-US conflict

With the UN calling for Kim Jong Un to be held accountable for Nazi like human rights abuse in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, it is worth bearing in mind what any escalation in North Korea would mean. The ensuing proxy war between the US and China is likely to have dramatic consequences.

James Dobbins in the dystopian titled academic journal ‘Survival: Global Politics and Strategy’ says that conflict in North Korea is the most likely of the sources for US/Chinese conflict and could lead to other conflict in a domino effect of Sino-Yank aggression.

The most likely trigger is in fact internal instability in North Korea. Something announcements like this from the UN is not going to help. Internal instability could currently lead to riots and regime collapse. While European English School theorists may condone the overthrow and neo conservatives like the idea of the possibility of a new democracy in the world, it would in fact be a disaster.

A confused, hungry and scared populous would flock to Chinese and South Korean borders. This would bring Chinese Shengyang Military units in to stem the flow of refugees and US/South Korean troops to the other border to do the same.

The US troops will also look to enter North Korea for a multitude of reasons 1) to confirm any intelligence they have had on North Korea, a test of its reconnaissance work over the last 30 years. 2) To have photographs taken like the Iwo Jima of US troop liberating the oppressed as to increase its damaged rep throughout the world, and most importantly 3) To secure known and unknown North Korean military based nuclear weapons and facilities. An unstable regime, as US boots advanced may wish to deploy nuclear weapons towards US bases in the region (if they can reach yet) and to Seoul itself. Did the UN think of this when it stoked the fire? Did it think what a crumbling North Korean regime would do as it was being invaded. Hitler ordered the burning of Paris before he shot himself and his wife, only for the local commander to refuse.

The UN making statements like it has may eventually get into North Korea via the steam of DVDs and USBs that are either smuggled in on boats or by balloon drop from China and Japan. It could engineer instability that would create a Chinese/US stand-off as they meet in the middle. Neither side would want to concede the state to the other. China would not want such close US forces (on the border) and US would not want further Chinese territorial gain.

Dobbins goes on from here to suggest that this would only be the start. This stand-off would lead to Chinese cyber warfare on US satellites working in the area. Chinese technology and knowhow in this sector of warfare is much more advanced and developed than the US and the US would retaliate likewise by engaging in cyber warfare through disrupting commercial shipping IT systems and transport. While this local cyber warfare is going on Dobbins states that China would also be looking to take advantage of this ability and try and exfiltrate US intelligence on the Chinese nuclear position.

China could also look to make good on intentions of repatriating Taiwan and make amphibious landing on the island. This would stretch US forces in particular its special forces that look to take on most of the tactical ground troop work. China would be unlikely to do the same with the disputed Diaoyu islands at this time due to the risk of bringing Japan into the foray and its proximity to South Korea.

The US can play the long game and starve China of energy as they control the oil routes through the Straits of Adan and Malacca through which China receive most of its oil but short term, especially in the cyber departments China could make a real impact.

UN should concentrate on encouraging openness and stability inside North Korea not make accusations and threaten its leader with court cases that would only make the failed state more hermitic. This kind of self-indulgent rhetoric on North Korean by the UN does not help its people and as I have set out with the help of Dobbins article, only makes war between China and the US and it possible trajectory more likely.

A summary of ‘The China Model: Can It Replace the Western Model of Modernisation’ in The Journal Of Contemporary China April:2010 by Suisheng Zhao.

This article looks to answer is the Chinese model, oft called the Beijing consensus, really that much different from the Washington consensus that describes neo liberal economics. It also looks to outline what positives and negatives it has.

Worryingly defined as being admired from Vietnam to Syria the author says the China Model includes aspects from free liberal economic policy along with what Suisheng Zhao amelioratively calls Strong government, an active secret police and state control over information.

The Washington consensus goes back to 1989 when a paper listed 10 aspects of neo liberal economics that would be palatable to bigwigs in Washington to be implemented in Latin America. This schema ended up not working and was followed in 2004 by another competing idea. John Ramos coined the Beijing consensus, an economic idea that focused on equality and basic quality of life as key performance indicators of the success of an economic policy rather than GDP per capita.

Complications come when supporters of free market liberalism see that the Bank of China is state run and property rights are weak to the extent that local Chinese authorities can sell land farmed for decades by rural peasants to developers to raise cash.

The Beijing consensus may be unfairly named as Singapore, South Korea and Hong Kong all have a history with oppressive governments and strong, fast paced, developing economies.

Suisheng Zhao claims China have basically cherry picked the best parts of the 1989 Washington consensus (page 7) and that calling China oppressive is a loaded term as it wishes to introduce democracy but just not at the expense of economy and what it sees as progress. The author back this up using the example of the 2003 amendment to the law that banned closed meeting and the ability of retired officials of continuing to hold sway over local decisions. 2003 also saw health officials held accountable for that years SARS outbreak.

The author, as promised, then moves onto + and – of the Chinese Model:

+

1.       It can be seen as an economic fast track without the social/political disorder that can be a by-product of democracy.

2.       According to Joseph Nye who seems to be everywhere in a politics degree it is particulary appealing to African states who in some cases really need both order and economic growth and quick.

3.       The debt in the West is not a good advert and has not been since 2008.

4.       The Washington consensus treats non developed states as being able to accept privatisation before proper regulatory control and democracy before a shared culture of political tolerance

5.       Chinese foreign policy is guided solely by economics not moral compass. This IS consistent if we note that the Bandung Protocols was signed in 1955.

 

Gerry Stoker may want to not that what LARRY Diamond called the ‘democratic recession’ in his 2008 book may be due to the US neo conservative installation of democracy when African states were not ready. This undermines democracy and makes people look for an alternative.

–

1.       It has no moral appeal. What A. Sen meant when he talked of the intrinsic human value of having your say.

2.       ‘Brand China’ is not trusted outside places like the Sudan and Zimbabwe.

3.       While impressive is any economic development worth the forced labour camps and environmental pollution.

4.       Most of Chinas development has come after the easing of the brutal rule. Maos time was less impressive that Dengs and as China has become less oppressive it has development has been more impressive.

5.       Chinas rise since the 1970’s has been so quick it is too early to judge whereas the liberal values the US live by today can be traced back to John Adams et al…

 

The author concludes with the notion of  a rising and happy middle class but says judgement should be put on hold until after the recession and the come back of the Washington consensus. Suisheng Zhao answers the questions set at the beginning when we learn. The China Model is not the same as the 1989 Washington consecus as China has just cherry picked the best bits. Maybe we should do the same of it such as making foreign policy decision based on economics not our moral compass. It seems to be working for both China and the infrastructure and ultimate happiness of Africans it has been applied to so far.