A summary of ‘Americas coming War with China’ (2005) by Ted Galen Carpenter.

Americas coming War with China (2005) by Ted Galen Carpenter. Palgrave Publishing

This summary is intended for those looking at International Security, China, US foreign policy and history. Carpenter begins with a future imaginary war between the US and China over Taiwan. The picture he paints is vivid and seemingly generated by a love of narrative and fiction. It is not until the subsequent chapters and Carpenters conclusion that we see that the imaginary war is in fact a result of his research and is more of a prophesy.

The future war begins with Taiwan’s independence rhetoric delivered through its media and the call by the president to change the state’s official name from Republic of China. The PRC then ramp up the action to reclaim Taiwan and cause the US to send aircraft carriers into the strait between the two states. China begins to take offence and after years of developing its own military to deal with the issue of Taiwan bombs the US naval presence. After airstrikes by USAF on the Chinese mainland the issue of Nuclear weapons raises its head and the war calms down to the point where Taiwan become part of China again, the US is humiliated militarily and economically after Chinese shedding of US bonds. Pages 1-25

At this point it may be right to scoff but after careful reading of the ensuing chapters Carpenter presents a good case for this being a decent stab at what might happen. Carpenter begins by laying the blame in the hands of the Chinese and colonial expansion in general. In 1895 A war between China and Japan over Korea resulted in Taiwan been given to Japan after Chinese defeat. Taiwan (already showing an independent streak) declared independence and made it a Japanese police state. Despite the occupation or may be because of it Taiwan developed a new culture and became a very different place to mainland China in 1943.

This became todays problem when Churchill and Roosevelt divvied up ex Japanese land and gave Taiwan to the Chinese after a Cairo conference. Here lyeth the problem. The US created their own problem. The ‘rough landing’ Page 34 China made on Taiwan upset locals and felt the hard work of developing a strong economy and industry was undone. Further local upset was caused by the nationalists using Taiwan as a base during the war with Mao in 1949.

Previous to the Cairo treaty Churchill and the US president decides on Mao had stated that he did not consider Taiwan ‘lost territory’ Page 37 But the two western leaders legitimised Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan in Cairo. This confuses things today.

During the Korean War in the 50’s Truman sent Aircraft carriers to the area and there was thinking that the US should use Nuclear weapons on mainland China to make the nationalists on Taiwan more able to reclaim what the communists had taken. In fact Eisenhower asked why ‘’Nuclear weapons shouldn’t be used exactly as you would a bullet’’ Page 43

In the 60’s JFK changed stance to recognise PRC as official China. This was however just a way of stoking up Chinese anti USSR feelings. This was clever by the US and Kissinger as the US strategy was to use Chinese war theorist Sun Tze’s philosophy and engage in war by causing friction with your enemies alliances.

In 1979 the US agreed to sell arms to Taiwan and including high tech fighter aircraft in 1981. Concomitantly, Chinese-US relations also improved due to Deng Xiapings modernisation and the need for China to import to develop.

Taiwan replied by democratising the country in order to win over US congressional support. Whatever the impact Bush Snr sold 150 top of the range jets to Taiwan in 1992. This could have been due to the fact Bush Snr was fighting an election and need the votes a big defence contract would bring. (he lost anyway) This gave Taiwan the confidence to court relationships with other nations which incensed China. 150,000 troops moved to Fujian province just over the water and after renewed US naval presence a further arms deal was signed including Attack Submarines. Page 71

Today the US want to trade with China and support democracy in Taiwan. A tricky situation. Any strategic ambiguity was cleared up by Bush Jrn in 2001 when he said ‘’we will defend Taiwan’’ Page 127.

All changed after 9/11 when China was needed by the US to reign in North Korea and assist with pressuring Pakistan and Central Asia to cooperate with dealing with terrorism.

In 2004 however the rise of China turned the tables. China now had the ability to take Taiwan. Reports and Think Tanks saw that 700+ Ballistic missiles were trained on Taiwanese economic hubs. The issue remained that Taiwan had decent air defence and only 20% of shoreline useful for amphibious assault. Page 153

The tipping point would be the introduction of a blockade that would result in Chinese submarine being hunted by depth charges. This would lead to an open naval warfare that would see China now superior Navy win out.

All this may seem as hypothetical as the initial chapter but is borne out by reliable intelligence and research. This was all thought through in 2005 and then said it would take 10 years for China to develop the amphibious hardware to invade or more of the same naval power to win any naval warfare brought about by a blockade.

The book, although depressing does show the kind of way China has been strategically moving to ensure a successful war over Taiwan and warns the west over interfering in sovereignty issues. It encourages us to find a peaceful end to the ‘one china’ dispute and perhaps the west should explain to Taiwan it would need to defend itself in the future and stay out of this affair. It seems inevitable that Taiwan will return to mainland control and other states in the area should not antagonise China into a war it cannot win (I.e Japan and the Diayou Islands)

A Review. Martin Jacques (2009) When China Rules the World: The Rise of the Middle Kingdom and the End of the Western World. Penguin Books: London.

This review/summary is intended for undergraduates looking at China or military strategy in relation to China.

Martin Jacques’ huge book is somewhat inappropriately titled. Only relatively small sections concern themselves with the rise and future of China and instead focus on the current state of China and how it relates to international relations today.

Jacques is clear however on his prophesy that:

‘’the rise of China will change the world in the most profound ways’’ p12.

He also states the rise will not be 1) only economical 2) be Western in execution and 3) part of a complaint international community.

The author anticipates a future where Chinese will be easily identifiable and invokes Huntington’s ‘fault lines’ to illustrate this. Despite European multiculturalism the future identities between Han Chinese and whites will be distinguishable.

Jacques, an editor for far left academic journals refutes JM Roberts claim that

‘’it is clear that the story of the west is the story of mankind, its influence so diffused that old oppositions are meaningless’’ p45.

Japanese culture did not westernise so why would Chinese? Jacques reminds us of the ‘century of humiliation’s suffered by the Chinese from a British diplomatic visit in 1793 to the occupation of Hong Kong in 1842 after the Opium Wars. And that there was no real sovereignty during the Qing Dynasty. This got worse not better and China was thought, at least by Jacques to have balkanised up to 1949 when Mao came to power.

Chinese identity remained strong as only the major port regions such as Macao and Hong Kong where developed and westernised. The ‘inner self’ of the Chinese was never subordinated.

Jacques leaves us thinking maybe the west should wish it did fully colonise China as it did the Middle East.

This humiliating time and partial occupation along with the remaining Chinese identity made Mao’s jobs of unifying China very easy. The author really does believe this as he cements it by saying:

‘’A Chinese nation state was forged under the leadership of Communists and Marxism, however more to do with Chinese nationalism with reassertion of Chinas former Glory’’ p97

Jacques then apologises for Mao with his claim that phase 1 of Communist rule brought industrialisation not seen for 100 years and 1949 to 1978 lay the foundations for growth.

He observes that we in the west are not ready for ‘Easternisation’ and we could be running into an inevitable problem because of it. Chinese language and news will permeate our lives in the West and we are as unprepared as we were for the transformation after Mao’s death.

The idea that oil per barrel may rise to $200.00 before 2020 allows us to look at the security issues we may experience in the near future. It is not just the democratic peace theory that poses an issue for peace theorists. Its quick introduction to China would cause growth problems as it has in Russia and India compared to China and would make the huge state vulnerable. Economic rise like Chinas and democracy don’t go together. Jacques reminds us that neither the US nor UK economic growth happened in fully democratic environments at home never mind in colonies. In fact according to the statistics that say China is only 50% through the transition and 50% of Chinas population still peasants it would be the worst time to democratise.

China has made effort to reach out. The 1994 Shanghai 5 treaty with Central Asian states and Russia and including Uzbekistan in 2001 was meant to tackle Islamic extremism and foster relationships but is far more telling for it’s the beginning of Chinas multilateral agreement making. It was successful too! Iran, India, Pakistan all became ‘observers’

Chinas reach also extends to territory it believes it owns in the South China Sea such as the Diayou/Spratly and Paracel Islands that mean it is in dispute with Japan, Vietnam and The Philipines respectively. China does not recognise Maritime Law as the US sees it. Chinese artefacts found on the island and an historic claim are all it sees as needed.

There is hope however, sovereignty in China does not take the Westphalia view. Deng Xiaoping in 1984 said that sovereignty can be put on hold and economic development for China and its possible future land comes first. As with Hong Kong, China can wait and then do very little change when it does in fact get ownership. In fact China can be said to have been patient and respectful. It knows it can, Jacques convincingly offers that 1.5 billion Chinese and local populations in the 10, 20 30 million bracket is nothing in Clausewitzian strategic terms. Territory with India is also at stake but as a nuclear power and the relative meaninglessness of the Kashmir region means this can be forgotten.

Taiwan however, that is ‘’unfinished business’’ p299. Chinas sees Taiwan as truly belonging to the mainland and studies Jacques cites show Taiwanese identity is so malleable it is only a matter of time before it does so.

The US may soon consider Taiwan to risky to continue giving a security guarantee as:

‘’China is not so far from achieving hegemony in the region’’ p315

Chinas relationship with Africa is fascinating. In 2007 40% of the continents cement was uses in the middle kingdom and the licences for mining are up for grabs as Africa unopposed compared to US presence in the Middle East. In 2009 following the Shanghai 5 success, 48 African states came to a Beijing conference and $5billion was promised including hospital building and granting of university places in Chinese universities. 100% of Angolan oil was the kind of makeweight agreed.

Chinas friendship with Iran could impinge its international reputation but since 1979 when US and UK stopped dealing with Iran, Chinas has had a free hand and has made a 2004 oil deal that could also satisfy Chinese want for Iran to become or remain a regional power. This would make China dominant in both west and east Asia. Maybe China are getting too big now? Russia were quick to buy up ex US army bases in central Asia when it became available and the US are worrying about Chinese deals with nuclear India and Pakistan.

The US has far, far greater military power than China thanks to an embargo of EU and US weapons. Russia are the only arms dealers China can do business with and they have incentives to stem the flow of offensive and defensive weapons. Despite Chinese military being modernised recently at the time of publication China does not have an aircraft carrier.