The Reasons for OMP Data Breach 2

Disclosures by ‘a senior government official’, the FBI and the White House have, over the past 24 hours, shown that a second OMP hack attributed to have come from China has dragged data relating to standard form 86 into the hands of those it was never intended to be.

News sources have described that unit 61398 (the PLA unit tasked with cyber/information warfare) has gained access to the form that asked respondents, intelligence officers and defence contractors to fill out details of mental health issues, financial situation and close family mamners including ‘people who are close to you’. The form can be found here: https://www.opm.gov/forms/pdf_fill/sf86.pdf

Initialy, the first hack on the 5th of June that gained access to the HR department or Officer for Personel Management (OPM) seemed useless and just a matter that would irk the US but the information on these forms is now of strategic use to the Chinese.

Attribution can be said to be probably from one of 3 sources at this time.

1) unit 61398, directly instructed by senior PLA commanders in the military council chaired by President Xi Jinping.

2) North Korea have been know to operate with in North East China and are thought to have recently hacked Sony.

3) Non state actors within China who would have links to those in the unit 61398.

Any of these scenarios mean China knew as the constraints on the internet in China mean its servers are tightly controlled and monitored and Westphilan attribution can level the problem directly with the state in China as being in the know or at least not being able to feign ignorance as to who did it, where and when.

The reasons why China have done this can be explained by China’s desperate and continuous work on proping the CCP and giving continued GDP rises to the Chinese people. The data in the forms of relating to contractors, people known to intelligence officers etc… mean China can remotely look to source engineering plans, defence blueprints and other related info and ideas from places outside US Government such as smaller previously unknown researchers and companies. This will speed up China’s military build up which will in the long run grant it energy and economic security. Ergo: keeping the Chinese population content with gradual 7% GPD rises year after year and the continuous rule of the CCP.

A British Bill Of Rights is Wrong

With the announcement by David Cameron at this years Tory party conference of wholesale changes to our position on Human Rights law, what effects will it have on people outside of the UK? A lot has been said of how it will improve the lives of British citizens but we also, as a developed economy and beneficiary of a history of oppression, hoodwinkery and violence against others have to consider other nation states.

By abandoning our commitment a universal human rights
law or set of laws and the creation of a British Bill of Rights we will loose the ability to question the human rights of other nation states.

I am specifically thinking off China but also of other states with any issue with their human rights record. Qatar for instance and its workers rights building FIFA world cup stadia or Nigeria and the rights for its gay community.
If Britain breaks from ithe human rights act how can we possibly question the behaviour of other states in relation to their human rights? As long as they have some codified rights in law they are no better or worse than the UK would be as the universality of human rights would no longer exist.

Unless we prescibe to the universality of human rights we begin to loose the battle. The English School looks at International Relations theory as a way of using human rights as a method of formalizing international relations,where are these supporters now? I expect more forceful opposing of the new British Bill of Rights from these people.
Its also, unfortunately, a death for our diplomacy. If our arguements for change, e.g prisoners not geting the vote then they should stand up to debate in European Legislature and Parliament. If it does not, why are we persueing in this we’re taking our ball home kind of way.

A British Bill of Rights, fails to consider anyone but ourselves, this is not a 21st Century British characteristic. The universality of human rights was what is so strong about it and an idea that has helped develop new ways of thinking about Foreign Policy.

Without this universality we cannot possiblely condemn other states and their individual interpretations of what constitutes human rights. If human rights is culturally determined then who are we to say Chinese treatment of Tibetans is wrong?

Keep the Human Rights Act as part of British Law and influence others to follow it not run away and put all the hard work at risk.

Study China Programme 2014 – Nanjing University

Day One/Two

Some what nervously, I travelled from Heathrow to Shanghai. I had prepared myself as much as possible not only in the run up to the trip but also by doing a Chinese Language module the previous semester and Understanding Modern China module at my university, Southampton but also by researching China and Nanjing as best I could. I would really recommend the Lonely Planet guide to anywhere but the China one was particulary useful. I met several people on Study China on the flight as they were not hard to identify. However, most were off to Beijing mot Nanjing.

My flight left the UK at 11:50 and I landed in Shanghai at 09:00 on Sunday morning. I was in plent of time for the shuttle bus but…. My luggage had been lost in Moscow (my connecting flight) and I was to be without it for some time. Owing to being tired and my natural disposition I did not let it worry me and slept most of the 5 hour shuttle bus to Nanjing. We arrived at Nanjing about 4pm and after some time checking in were in our rooms at 5pm. I was so lucky to get a great room mate. We got on immediately and ended up borrowing a few t shirts until my luggage arrivd some days later. After unpacking and familiarising ourselves with the hotel, we went out to eat. There was loads to chose from and luckily we had a good Chinese speaker to help order. We went to bed well fed and a little less nervous about the forthcoming 3 weeks.

Day 3

I naturally wake up early anyway but when I am in a new place I like to explore. I woke up at 6:30 and went round the corner to a street food vendor where I got a breakfast wrap for 4 Yuan (40p) I was strange having a bit of spice in the morning but was very tasty. I went back to our room to shower and prepare for our meeting at 9am. We gathered for a opening ceremony with a speech from a student and a talk from the University which is the 3rd best in China! After this we had a small tour of the campus andthen had the rest of the afternoon to ourselves. We ate lunch and headed towards the Confucious temple area for a look around. After this we went to the Nanjing city walls which was very very impressive we arrived at dusk and saw the city light up as night fell. That evening we when to Ellens Bar for a drink before going to bed and resting before lessons in the morning.

Day 4

Today was the day my luggage arrived but not before lessons had started. Today was Tuesday and we began with a meeting at 8:50 before being shown to our classrooms. We then had Chinese from 9-12 and then a two hour break for lunch. We then had Chinese Philosophy for 3 hours which, while it was not my first choice I am so glad I did and a module on Confucianism and Daoism will look so good on my CV. My luggage arrived after this and I was able to get into my own clothes and have a shower with my own wash bag. Yey!!! What I relief! I did half an hour or so of Chinese in the evening and then we went for a walk down to the 1912 district where all the bars are. after exploring we went home and to be. I really felt I had made some friends in the 4 days and has started to find a little more about some of the people. It was such a big mix of degree subjects and universities. However, it had dawned on me that the vast majority of people were from very wealthy backgrounds. Not that they were not great people but very few people came from the back ground I did of working class people.

Day 5

Today was Chinese between 9-12 again and I took the option of arriving an hour early at 8am to swot up a little before class. I am dyslexic and need to spend time doing something for it to slowly sink in. There was no point in coming all this way and taking it easy. After some great street food near the university entrance we had our first Taiji lesson and Calligraphy lesson. Both were new to me and the Taiji in particular was fascinating and so so funny. I really engaged myself with it and found it to be very relaxing. Doing it in front of 25 people you have known for 5 days is actually a plus point. Doing the first Taiji really got me exicited for the next lesson which was in a few days time.

Day 6

We had Chinese from 9-12 again and I did from 8 to 9 again in the classroom on my own. It really helps and I would recomment it to anyone as a way of consolidating what you know. After the lesson we were on a half day and I chose to try out the gym and see what it was like. I paid 10 Yuan for entry and they had every piece of equipment you could imagine apart from a rowing machine and free weights. There was also an athletics staium that was open to the public for free and had approx 200 people in it at anytime. There was room to run round though but as it was midday it was probably a bit too hot so I stuck to the gym. There is no A/C in there but it was good as it was like having a sauna and a workout at the same time. After having a shower me and my group of about 10 went to the Nanjing Massacre Museum. I had not heard a thing about it and was shocked to learn about the killing by the Japanese army in 1937 of the abandoned residents of Nanjing. It really affected me and while I would recommend going, be warned it does not hold back.

Day 7

Today we had our usual Chinese lesson and then the Philosophy lesson. Today was a little different as we all sat in a circle and discussed the issues at hand. This meant everyone had more chance to speak and engaged a little more. After classes I when to the gym again and then got ready to go out. We were heading down to 1912 and were planning to have a dance and meet some Chinese people even if it was just to sday Ni Hao!

Day 8

Saturday, and my group were heading towards the lake and the temple. It was so humid but once you get over the fact you really enjoy the climate. I much prefer it to dry heat. The smog over Nanjing also doesn’t help but it did not ditract from the amazing views and sounds of the two areas we visited. We must have walked miles by the lake and it was a good chance to get to know some of the people I went with. When I got back I did some washing which meant getting a washing maching card and topping it up in the wash room. I had borrowed some washing powder from a friend who had bought a sack load.

Day 9

Day 9 went so fast. It was a whole day off and was spent by going down to the gym in the morning and then an amazing afternoon at the Presidential Palace. It was really good to go to as It was in effect a history lesson on the fall of the first republic and the rise of the communist state. As I do Politics and International Relations as a degree subject it helped me understand what happened during that time and is something I may use when I enter my 3rd year at Southampton. After the Palace we ate street food which is some of the best I have ever had. Its also good because people try new things and get things from different places while all remaining together. Most things cost 5-10 Yuan so trying new things is not expensive.

Day 10

Today was back to classes and I did an hour Chinese in the morning before lesson. I then did the 3 hour lesson. Things really start to stack up in the second week I recommend you really kjeep chipping away and do the odd hour here and there as it is better than huge blocks. We then had our third Philosophy lecture and were given details of the assessment. It was to a presentation in groups of 4 or 5 and we given a large remit to work with. We basically had to use the material we had learned to answer a question we set ourselves. We chose, where does goodness come from? We met in our groups afterwards and planned to do some solo work and meet again later in the week.

Day 11

Today was Chinese for 3 hours  as well as my usual hour in the morning followed by the trip to the 2014 Nanjing Youth Olympic Games. We went on the coach and played games on the way and then went into the badminton arena. We saw lots of different games on three courts with some more one sided than others. I had never seen badminton live before and it was exiting to experience. On returning to the accommodation I when to the gym again and then did a good hour or so of Chinese as my roommate was out and working in the quiet is good now and again.

Day 12

Chinese lesson today was very hard as we were all very tired. However, doing it was good and no doubt some of it went in. It is the sheer consistency of doing Chinese everyday that helps in the end. We had our second and last Taiji and Calligraphy lessons and it was sad that it ended. I will try and use the Taiji I learned back at home but onl really learned two moves. It would have been nice to have had more Taiji lessons and would recommend that future study china programmes do this. We also had our class photos on this day.

Day 13

In Chinese today we were given a small task of preparing for a short oral test on the title ‘my day in China’ the emphasis was on the tones rather than length which made it very hard. After another two hour lunch break which I was getting used to by now. You can use it to take a knap as it is very hot in the day, or to explore the local area for street food or work. Because China is 8 hours ahead you cannot Skype or phone home at lunch time and this has to be kept to evenings. In the afternoon we made traditional Chinese dumplings with some advice from the student advisors.

Day 14

Today was more Chinese for the three hours and then the last of our lectures on can the heart think/Chinese philosophy. In the evening about 30 of us went to KTV a Chinese karaoke place, for a students 21st birthday party. It was on 5 floors and one each floor was about 30 rooms. It is so big in China. Everyone had a good singsong and a certain someone had a great 21st Birthday in China. We went to a nice restarant before called Nanjing Impressions. It was highly recommended in all the guidebooks and was really good and traditional.

Day 15/16

Today was the history groups turn to go on a trip and I went along as it was up the Purple Mountain which had cable cars and temples. It was another really hot day and the smog was giving us really high pressure again. We spend ages there and it was nice to spend time with other groups for a change. When I got back I had another knap and spent the rest of the day looking round the uni and preparing for the presentations we had in philosophy and in Chinese. I was getting a little nervous and needed to knuckle down. I had a lie in on Sunday, the first one for a long time as I had been working at home before I went to China. I went to the gym and did some more work before going to bed. The aircon is so nice and 25 degrees in the perfect temp to sleep to. It does however mean that when my roommate got ill, I too got it. If not through the aircon then the sharing of food and close proximity in lessons etc…

Day 17

Back to work on Monday and another hour of Chinese before the lesson. We then had a half day and went quickly to another temple but this was unlike any of the others. It was on one of the main roads in Nanjing but behind the wall was an oasis of rockeries and peace gardens, bonzi trees and waterfalls. It was amazing to think that just a few metres behind the hustle and bustle of the city was such peaceful surroundings. It began to rain while we were there and it was monsoon rain for approx one hour. When it eased off we got some street food and got a taxi home. My advice would be to take an umbrella. We finalised our presentations as for tomorrow we had both our Chinese and philosophy ones to give.

Day 18

Presentation Day: My Chinese presentation was not as good as some but I was happy with it. They lasted until the break and then had our normal Chinese lesson. We then had our two hour break when we had a quick meeting before the afternoon presentation. The philosophy presentation went very well despite being very nervous. Everyone’s was very different and I had no idea what was coming next. One person even did a poem. I was please with whaat I did as we didn’t have access to the uni library and the internet connectivity was very poor. I did a comparison between Plato and Confucious which would never have been able to do without Study China.

Day 19

Visit to Nanjing Museum. It was huge! but lacked the exhibits to put in it.There were vast swayths of space with nothing in it. After the museum we tries to find the Ming tomb which was easier said than done. We went on the metro which was 2 Yuan for any journey which is really cheap and such an experience if you are only used to the underground or the trams in Manchester. We then went home and began to revise as in two days we were to have our Chinese written exam and I had to learn a lot of Characters.

Day 20

Our last lesson of Chinese and then a half day to prepare for the test. We did go out for a bit though as it is easy to get cabin fever if you stay in even for just a few hours. There are so many places to go even for a couple of hours just make sure you get a good guidebook.

Day 21/22….

The last day of the programme. We had our Chinese test where I wrote the whole exam in Chinese characters.  We had an hour to do it in and afterwards we watched a kungfu film where we had the chance to try and pick up the spoken chinese. We also practised a song and dance we had to perform for the closing ceremony later that day. We were singing a love song and had choreographed some dance moves to it. We all got changed into smart clothes and headed to the closing ceremony where we heard a closing speech from a student and from the staff at the university. We then had our closing ceremony meal and some people headead off as they had early flights to catch. I was heading off to Shanghai the next day and got the 11am shuttle bus.

Methodology in Action –

I have used some of what I have learned about methodology in an essay I wrote for another module. Methodology part begins at 3.

The State of the Study of China: Towards a Better Understanding of Chinas Rise and Strategic Intentions.

The rise of China is set to be the most important aspect of international relations over the coming decades. ‘The Tragedy of Great Power Politics’ (2001) warned us that US foreign policy in relation to China was both ‘misguided’ and ‘doomed to failure.’ In no uncertain terms John Mearsheimer implored that the US ‘reverse course and do what it can to slow the rise of China.’ (Mearsheimer, 2001, p.401-402)

In the first part of this essay I will attempt to briefly describe how neo realism and offensive realism engineers China into being a threat to the US. I will explain that according to neo realism China has little choice but to develop into a regional hegemon. In the second part I suggest this may have had an adverse methodological effect on how China is studied by the west. Finally, I document some solutions to this problem and warn that while it may not be true that China is ‘unlikely to assume defence commitments beyond its immediate periphery’ (Dobbins, 2012 p.9) claims that China are acting or will act offensively need to be grounded on fair and unbiased social science led research.

1. How neo realism forces China to rise

A study of neo-realism says that it ‘posits that the anarchic structure of the international system conditions inter-state relations and that conflict is an enduring possibility’ (Glenn, 2003, p.5). This allows Mearsheimer to predict that Chinas rise will not be peaceful because states ‘seek to survive under anarchy by maximising their power relative to other states, in order to maintain the means of self-defence… they sometimes see aggression as the best way to accumulate more power at the expense of rivals.’ (Mearsheimer, 1990, p.15)

Thanks to Mearsheimer and others, neo realism is of course an enduring idea that seems to explain so much from the past (Mearsheimer, 1990) and helps us form coherent and feasible models for the future (Mearsheimer, 2001).

The past can of course be verified by empirical record. The future, according to the theory, can be predicted as states cannot help but seek to maximise relative power over other states and become regional hegemons in the anarchical international system (Mearsheimer, 2001, p.33-36). No matter how much we abhor this, it is a predefined course of events.

It means one can agree that the world abides by neo-realist rules and at the same time, and until a world government holds sway, wish that it did not. This is what is meant by the works title. It is a tragedy. Going by this explanation China has the reputation it has thanks, in part, to the structural, unalterable conditions we exist in. This must in some ways create and foster a feeling of inevitability amongst believers in the theory and could lead to a culture of failing to properly produce evidence supporting or refuting the proposition.

2. How neo realism can restrict our understanding of Chinas rise.

Despite this structural course that proponents of neo-realism and in particular Mearsheimer’s offensive realism suggest, it is perhaps unfair to hastily tarnish Chinas defence strategy with the offensive neo-realism brush. Recent studies can show China to be following the course Mearsheimer sets out, in looking to create a regional hegemon. This can be seen in studies of conventional strategy China is engaged in such as in the recent appraisal of Chinese military ability by Steven Blank. Blank documents recent Chinese military strategy that is supposedly designed to compete with US defence interests in the region and appears to conform to the events neo realism predicts (Blank, 2013 p.245). The issue these and other studies of China have is that given our thorough knowledge of neo realism as an international relations theory that says certain events are structural and unstoppable, the identification of evidence that seems to genuinely and independently support it is very important.

We have a situation where theory, and perhaps stereotypes, are informing data and evidence rather than the other way round. For instance, Blanks’ work on the Chinese military does not fully explore the United States’ control over the major energy silk roads in the straits of Aden and Malacca and the extent to which this affects the arms deal that recently saw China purchase $2Billion of Aircraft and submarines from Russia (Blank, 2013 p.248). It also fails to recognise that 75% of Chinese oil will need to be imported by 2020 (Jacques, 2009 p.325). This should be taken into consideration as perhaps the variable affecting Chinese military spending in this way is the issue over protecting a supply of energy not the development of a Navy that could rival the local US Naval presence and develop its hegemony. Blanks work is therefore incomplete and hastily concludes that Chinas behaviour is threatening rather than defensive.

3. Solutions

The problem of influenced research on China has been covered by Yung Wei in a series of points raised in his article ‘Social Science and the Methodology of Contemporary China Studies: A Critical Evaluation’ (1985). It was designed to warn us that theories can be self-fulfilling prophesies and that we should conduct sound social science research to combat, and help guard against it.

He outlines three main issues which influence research into China. These would then suggest we look again at how we know what we know about China and we may be at risk of being misinformed.

Firstly, Wei said there is a tendency by western scholars to take a purely ‘sinological approach’ to the study of the China and these arrive at purely descriptive accounts of Chinese history and culture. (Wei, 1985 p.3). This allows policy makers and lay readers to interpret from this what they want. While this kind of research is helpful and particularly in Chinas case absolutely fascinating, Wei argues that for us to understand China better and to understand the broad discipline of social sciences at its universal level of analysis, future academics should employ social science methodology to the study of China and the Chinese and not continue to be purely descriptive (Wei, 1985 p.10). This would mean Blanks’ disclosure of Sino-Russian military hardware deals should come with deeper social science led exploration as to the reason why.

Studying China in this way then presents some methodology problems and asks fundamental questions such as what is the meaning of China? Do we mean Communist China or Taiwan and China? (Wei, 1985 p.6) It is a question that can be asked of the study of Chinese defence strategy such as when Michael Pillsbury questions the analysis of the PLA and US Armed Forces by comparative means. (Pillsbury, 2001 p.1). The means of study need to be first tested and then set.

Secondly, Wei believes that the misrepresentation of China through research can be due to the wanton and the deliberate distortion of reality. While Wei rightly questions the academic integrity of those guilty of the latter, Wei does cite the factor of McCarthyism in the study of China for US academics in the 1950’s and perhaps the distortion of reality at this time can be excused by the very real threat of imprisonment, blacklisting and personal and professional ruin. (Wei, 1985 p.7). These are hardly accusations that can be levelled at western researchers. There are no repercussions so great that could excuse deliberate and premeditated distortion of evidence today.

Thirdly, and importantly for those questioning whether Mearsheimer’s predictions are having too greater influence on the results of research on Chinas defence spending and military intentions, is what Wei calls ‘orientation’ and while not intentionally distortive, it can be just as damaging. Orientation is the conditions in which the research is being conducted and under what circumstances. While McCarthyism may have made academics intentionally doctor results and conclusions or omit certain information on China. The very real fear and threat of nuclear war throughout the 1950’s and the thought of China developing its own may have subconsciously influenced work produced at the time. This idea is not unique to the threat of nuclear war. Having understood the repercussions of neo-realism and Mearsheimer’s prediction of Chinas offensive rise, a researchers ‘orientation’ maybe biased to such a degree that their findings are formed by the theory instead of the findings supporting the theory.

However, orientation can take different forms. In Kumar Singhs analysis of Chinas defence modernisation from 1949-2005 as part of the ‘Four Modernisations’ he laments the non-western accounting style and lack of breakdown on research and development spending and PLA Navy spending (Kumar Singh, 2005 p.690). This is a legitimate concern where the orientation of a western scholar to want comprehensible and transparent data from which to conduct research is integral to understanding China. It leaves gaps in our knowledge that means attempts to fill it (Luff and Erickson, 2013 p.815) risk the danger of being subconsciously led by neo realist predictions.

In conclusion, Mearsheimer’s offensive realism has an ironic twist. It can structurally predispose researchers to producing evidence in support of it. Only a move to using vigorous and probably quantitative findings can we be sure that evidence in support of neo realism is trustworthy and not affected by the pitfalls of weak research.

References

Blank, Steven (2013) ‘Russo-China Military Relations’ The Journal of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy 35:5 pp 755-785

Dobbins, James (2012) ’War With China’ Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 54:4 pp 7-24

Glenn John (2004) Neorealism Versus Strategic Culture. Ashgate: Aldershot.

Jacques, Martin (2009) ‘When China Rules the World’ Penguin Books: London

Kumar Singh, Bhartendu (2005) ‘The Political Economy of Chinas Defence Modernisation. Strategic Analysis, 29:4 pp 680-706

Luff, Adam and Erikson, Andrew (2013) ’Demystifying Chinas Defence Spending’ The China Quarterly 21:6 pp 815-830

Mearsheimer, John J (1990) Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War’ International security Vol. 15(1)

Mearsheimer, John J (2001) The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. W W. Norton & Company: London.

Pillsbury, Michael (2001) Chinas Military Strategy Toward The U.S. A View from Open Sources

Wei, Yung (1985) ‘Social Science and the Methodology of Contemporary China Studies: A Critical Evaluation’ found at http://www.yungwei.url.tw/file/C20.pdf [Accessed 28/03/2014]

Applied Research Methods

I will be giving a presentation on Chinese International Security. This meant I was looking at a single case study as a research design and followed some advice from Stoker and Marsh and George and Alexander. This was my first effort of knowingly applying a research method to my work. Its not much and will be fully explained in the presentation but click the link to see how to use ideas from literature on research design to say why you have done what you have done.

Chinese International Security Presentation – Selected Slides: Applied Research Methodology

A summary of ‘Americas coming War with China’ (2005) by Ted Galen Carpenter.

Americas coming War with China (2005) by Ted Galen Carpenter. Palgrave Publishing

This summary is intended for those looking at International Security, China, US foreign policy and history. Carpenter begins with a future imaginary war between the US and China over Taiwan. The picture he paints is vivid and seemingly generated by a love of narrative and fiction. It is not until the subsequent chapters and Carpenters conclusion that we see that the imaginary war is in fact a result of his research and is more of a prophesy.

The future war begins with Taiwan’s independence rhetoric delivered through its media and the call by the president to change the state’s official name from Republic of China. The PRC then ramp up the action to reclaim Taiwan and cause the US to send aircraft carriers into the strait between the two states. China begins to take offence and after years of developing its own military to deal with the issue of Taiwan bombs the US naval presence. After airstrikes by USAF on the Chinese mainland the issue of Nuclear weapons raises its head and the war calms down to the point where Taiwan become part of China again, the US is humiliated militarily and economically after Chinese shedding of US bonds. Pages 1-25

At this point it may be right to scoff but after careful reading of the ensuing chapters Carpenter presents a good case for this being a decent stab at what might happen. Carpenter begins by laying the blame in the hands of the Chinese and colonial expansion in general. In 1895 A war between China and Japan over Korea resulted in Taiwan been given to Japan after Chinese defeat. Taiwan (already showing an independent streak) declared independence and made it a Japanese police state. Despite the occupation or may be because of it Taiwan developed a new culture and became a very different place to mainland China in 1943.

This became todays problem when Churchill and Roosevelt divvied up ex Japanese land and gave Taiwan to the Chinese after a Cairo conference. Here lyeth the problem. The US created their own problem. The ‘rough landing’ Page 34 China made on Taiwan upset locals and felt the hard work of developing a strong economy and industry was undone. Further local upset was caused by the nationalists using Taiwan as a base during the war with Mao in 1949.

Previous to the Cairo treaty Churchill and the US president decides on Mao had stated that he did not consider Taiwan ‘lost territory’ Page 37 But the two western leaders legitimised Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan in Cairo. This confuses things today.

During the Korean War in the 50’s Truman sent Aircraft carriers to the area and there was thinking that the US should use Nuclear weapons on mainland China to make the nationalists on Taiwan more able to reclaim what the communists had taken. In fact Eisenhower asked why ‘’Nuclear weapons shouldn’t be used exactly as you would a bullet’’ Page 43

In the 60’s JFK changed stance to recognise PRC as official China. This was however just a way of stoking up Chinese anti USSR feelings. This was clever by the US and Kissinger as the US strategy was to use Chinese war theorist Sun Tze’s philosophy and engage in war by causing friction with your enemies alliances.

In 1979 the US agreed to sell arms to Taiwan and including high tech fighter aircraft in 1981. Concomitantly, Chinese-US relations also improved due to Deng Xiapings modernisation and the need for China to import to develop.

Taiwan replied by democratising the country in order to win over US congressional support. Whatever the impact Bush Snr sold 150 top of the range jets to Taiwan in 1992. This could have been due to the fact Bush Snr was fighting an election and need the votes a big defence contract would bring. (he lost anyway) This gave Taiwan the confidence to court relationships with other nations which incensed China. 150,000 troops moved to Fujian province just over the water and after renewed US naval presence a further arms deal was signed including Attack Submarines. Page 71

Today the US want to trade with China and support democracy in Taiwan. A tricky situation. Any strategic ambiguity was cleared up by Bush Jrn in 2001 when he said ‘’we will defend Taiwan’’ Page 127.

All changed after 9/11 when China was needed by the US to reign in North Korea and assist with pressuring Pakistan and Central Asia to cooperate with dealing with terrorism.

In 2004 however the rise of China turned the tables. China now had the ability to take Taiwan. Reports and Think Tanks saw that 700+ Ballistic missiles were trained on Taiwanese economic hubs. The issue remained that Taiwan had decent air defence and only 20% of shoreline useful for amphibious assault. Page 153

The tipping point would be the introduction of a blockade that would result in Chinese submarine being hunted by depth charges. This would lead to an open naval warfare that would see China now superior Navy win out.

All this may seem as hypothetical as the initial chapter but is borne out by reliable intelligence and research. This was all thought through in 2005 and then said it would take 10 years for China to develop the amphibious hardware to invade or more of the same naval power to win any naval warfare brought about by a blockade.

The book, although depressing does show the kind of way China has been strategically moving to ensure a successful war over Taiwan and warns the west over interfering in sovereignty issues. It encourages us to find a peaceful end to the ‘one china’ dispute and perhaps the west should explain to Taiwan it would need to defend itself in the future and stay out of this affair. It seems inevitable that Taiwan will return to mainland control and other states in the area should not antagonise China into a war it cannot win (I.e Japan and the Diayou Islands)

A Review. Martin Jacques (2009) When China Rules the World: The Rise of the Middle Kingdom and the End of the Western World. Penguin Books: London.

This review/summary is intended for undergraduates looking at China or military strategy in relation to China.

Martin Jacques’ huge book is somewhat inappropriately titled. Only relatively small sections concern themselves with the rise and future of China and instead focus on the current state of China and how it relates to international relations today.

Jacques is clear however on his prophesy that:

‘’the rise of China will change the world in the most profound ways’’ p12.

He also states the rise will not be 1) only economical 2) be Western in execution and 3) part of a complaint international community.

The author anticipates a future where Chinese will be easily identifiable and invokes Huntington’s ‘fault lines’ to illustrate this. Despite European multiculturalism the future identities between Han Chinese and whites will be distinguishable.

Jacques, an editor for far left academic journals refutes JM Roberts claim that

‘’it is clear that the story of the west is the story of mankind, its influence so diffused that old oppositions are meaningless’’ p45.

Japanese culture did not westernise so why would Chinese? Jacques reminds us of the ‘century of humiliation’s suffered by the Chinese from a British diplomatic visit in 1793 to the occupation of Hong Kong in 1842 after the Opium Wars. And that there was no real sovereignty during the Qing Dynasty. This got worse not better and China was thought, at least by Jacques to have balkanised up to 1949 when Mao came to power.

Chinese identity remained strong as only the major port regions such as Macao and Hong Kong where developed and westernised. The ‘inner self’ of the Chinese was never subordinated.

Jacques leaves us thinking maybe the west should wish it did fully colonise China as it did the Middle East.

This humiliating time and partial occupation along with the remaining Chinese identity made Mao’s jobs of unifying China very easy. The author really does believe this as he cements it by saying:

‘’A Chinese nation state was forged under the leadership of Communists and Marxism, however more to do with Chinese nationalism with reassertion of Chinas former Glory’’ p97

Jacques then apologises for Mao with his claim that phase 1 of Communist rule brought industrialisation not seen for 100 years and 1949 to 1978 lay the foundations for growth.

He observes that we in the west are not ready for ‘Easternisation’ and we could be running into an inevitable problem because of it. Chinese language and news will permeate our lives in the West and we are as unprepared as we were for the transformation after Mao’s death.

The idea that oil per barrel may rise to $200.00 before 2020 allows us to look at the security issues we may experience in the near future. It is not just the democratic peace theory that poses an issue for peace theorists. Its quick introduction to China would cause growth problems as it has in Russia and India compared to China and would make the huge state vulnerable. Economic rise like Chinas and democracy don’t go together. Jacques reminds us that neither the US nor UK economic growth happened in fully democratic environments at home never mind in colonies. In fact according to the statistics that say China is only 50% through the transition and 50% of Chinas population still peasants it would be the worst time to democratise.

China has made effort to reach out. The 1994 Shanghai 5 treaty with Central Asian states and Russia and including Uzbekistan in 2001 was meant to tackle Islamic extremism and foster relationships but is far more telling for it’s the beginning of Chinas multilateral agreement making. It was successful too! Iran, India, Pakistan all became ‘observers’

Chinas reach also extends to territory it believes it owns in the South China Sea such as the Diayou/Spratly and Paracel Islands that mean it is in dispute with Japan, Vietnam and The Philipines respectively. China does not recognise Maritime Law as the US sees it. Chinese artefacts found on the island and an historic claim are all it sees as needed.

There is hope however, sovereignty in China does not take the Westphalia view. Deng Xiaoping in 1984 said that sovereignty can be put on hold and economic development for China and its possible future land comes first. As with Hong Kong, China can wait and then do very little change when it does in fact get ownership. In fact China can be said to have been patient and respectful. It knows it can, Jacques convincingly offers that 1.5 billion Chinese and local populations in the 10, 20 30 million bracket is nothing in Clausewitzian strategic terms. Territory with India is also at stake but as a nuclear power and the relative meaninglessness of the Kashmir region means this can be forgotten.

Taiwan however, that is ‘’unfinished business’’ p299. Chinas sees Taiwan as truly belonging to the mainland and studies Jacques cites show Taiwanese identity is so malleable it is only a matter of time before it does so.

The US may soon consider Taiwan to risky to continue giving a security guarantee as:

‘’China is not so far from achieving hegemony in the region’’ p315

Chinas relationship with Africa is fascinating. In 2007 40% of the continents cement was uses in the middle kingdom and the licences for mining are up for grabs as Africa unopposed compared to US presence in the Middle East. In 2009 following the Shanghai 5 success, 48 African states came to a Beijing conference and $5billion was promised including hospital building and granting of university places in Chinese universities. 100% of Angolan oil was the kind of makeweight agreed.

Chinas friendship with Iran could impinge its international reputation but since 1979 when US and UK stopped dealing with Iran, Chinas has had a free hand and has made a 2004 oil deal that could also satisfy Chinese want for Iran to become or remain a regional power. This would make China dominant in both west and east Asia. Maybe China are getting too big now? Russia were quick to buy up ex US army bases in central Asia when it became available and the US are worrying about Chinese deals with nuclear India and Pakistan.

The US has far, far greater military power than China thanks to an embargo of EU and US weapons. Russia are the only arms dealers China can do business with and they have incentives to stem the flow of offensive and defensive weapons. Despite Chinese military being modernised recently at the time of publication China does not have an aircraft carrier.

Two methods the UK should adopt to create stable change in North Korea

On the way towards a more predictable, open North Korea.
Efforts and sentiment towards this aim have often concentrated on the inevitability of offensive military tactics and rhetoric in relation to the hermetic state. As I have recently stated, rather than this being the best way of dealing with North Korea it would probably lead to a stalemate between the US and China and do nothing for the people suffering in the country as North Korea would be an occupied failed state.
The question therefore remains what to do about the issue. One solution I have put forward before is the so introduction of new ideas and media to North Korea with the aim of slowly altering social norms. PUST University is a charity funded higher education establishment in the capital that educates the top elite’s children in English language, western business studies and other subjects. This may very well be a long and slow process to change but this proliferation of ideas and change will better serve the need for stable transition.
UK policy for North Korea should be the introduction of their own state funded but NGO status university. This could educate North Korean youth as PUST does fully expecting and anticipating the control of the regime. It has been my observation of PUST that some new ideas and the pulling of the veil of ignorance from the students will seep through. North Korean government are at such a state of desperation that they are willing to take this chance, thinking they can deal with it. This is where the UK can take advantage. Nothing as serious as ballistic missile technology would be taught, just business studies, economics and history but it is a beginning and these students will be the elite of tomorrow and be able to facilitate stable, organised and peaceful change. These are the students who may be able to negotiate the states inclusion into world affairs at the concession of joining the NPT (nuclear non-proliferation treaty) and MTCR (missile technology control regime)
Secondly and concomitantly, UK secret service should look to set up a desk that looks at facilitating the movement of media software and hardware into the state via Russian/Chinese border and South Korea. These groups (basically a hand full of individuals) already exist and can be assisted with cash or/and motivation from MI6 to keep the flow of USB’s, DVD, and smartphones into the state and begin the alter norms in the country via a bottom up route. This also need not rock the boat too much and introduce a stable change inside the state not by force. Observations into this already show positive effects.
The UK will be seen as helpful in its overt efforts and relatively interfering in its intelligence operations. The cost of the university could be as little as £10miliion pounds and £1million a year to create one half the size of PUST and the MI6 work could easily be based out of a small office possibly with just one person on a 2 or 3 year mission to get media into the country through existing networks of smugglers. This, including set up costs and wages could cost as little as £50 thousand pounds a year.

How UN self indulgence on North Korea could lead to a Sino-US conflict

With the UN calling for Kim Jong Un to be held accountable for Nazi like human rights abuse in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, it is worth bearing in mind what any escalation in North Korea would mean. The ensuing proxy war between the US and China is likely to have dramatic consequences.

James Dobbins in the dystopian titled academic journal ‘Survival: Global Politics and Strategy’ says that conflict in North Korea is the most likely of the sources for US/Chinese conflict and could lead to other conflict in a domino effect of Sino-Yank aggression.

The most likely trigger is in fact internal instability in North Korea. Something announcements like this from the UN is not going to help. Internal instability could currently lead to riots and regime collapse. While European English School theorists may condone the overthrow and neo conservatives like the idea of the possibility of a new democracy in the world, it would in fact be a disaster.

A confused, hungry and scared populous would flock to Chinese and South Korean borders. This would bring Chinese Shengyang Military units in to stem the flow of refugees and US/South Korean troops to the other border to do the same.

The US troops will also look to enter North Korea for a multitude of reasons 1) to confirm any intelligence they have had on North Korea, a test of its reconnaissance work over the last 30 years. 2) To have photographs taken like the Iwo Jima of US troop liberating the oppressed as to increase its damaged rep throughout the world, and most importantly 3) To secure known and unknown North Korean military based nuclear weapons and facilities. An unstable regime, as US boots advanced may wish to deploy nuclear weapons towards US bases in the region (if they can reach yet) and to Seoul itself. Did the UN think of this when it stoked the fire? Did it think what a crumbling North Korean regime would do as it was being invaded. Hitler ordered the burning of Paris before he shot himself and his wife, only for the local commander to refuse.

The UN making statements like it has may eventually get into North Korea via the steam of DVDs and USBs that are either smuggled in on boats or by balloon drop from China and Japan. It could engineer instability that would create a Chinese/US stand-off as they meet in the middle. Neither side would want to concede the state to the other. China would not want such close US forces (on the border) and US would not want further Chinese territorial gain.

Dobbins goes on from here to suggest that this would only be the start. This stand-off would lead to Chinese cyber warfare on US satellites working in the area. Chinese technology and knowhow in this sector of warfare is much more advanced and developed than the US and the US would retaliate likewise by engaging in cyber warfare through disrupting commercial shipping IT systems and transport. While this local cyber warfare is going on Dobbins states that China would also be looking to take advantage of this ability and try and exfiltrate US intelligence on the Chinese nuclear position.

China could also look to make good on intentions of repatriating Taiwan and make amphibious landing on the island. This would stretch US forces in particular its special forces that look to take on most of the tactical ground troop work. China would be unlikely to do the same with the disputed Diaoyu islands at this time due to the risk of bringing Japan into the foray and its proximity to South Korea.

The US can play the long game and starve China of energy as they control the oil routes through the Straits of Adan and Malacca through which China receive most of its oil but short term, especially in the cyber departments China could make a real impact.

UN should concentrate on encouraging openness and stability inside North Korea not make accusations and threaten its leader with court cases that would only make the failed state more hermitic. This kind of self-indulgent rhetoric on North Korean by the UN does not help its people and as I have set out with the help of Dobbins article, only makes war between China and the US and it possible trajectory more likely.

How to stem the rise of the Chinese criminal youth

 

From 1995 onwards there was a large scale migration of peasants in the West of China to the cities to participate in the boom of industry there. In 1949 10% of the Chinese population lived in cities, by 2011 50% of Chinas 1.37 Billion people lived in cities.

This drew mainly men of working age to the cities tired of low wages and corrupt local officials who could sell off the land they tilled to developers moving West from Beijing and Shanghai.

This left a gap back home as children often lacked a father figure and father figures within the community. The remittances were welcome but this was offset by the absence of a whole cohort of males from many western Chinese villages. As such many younger men and children were and are involved in crime in rural China. Local decisions are often made in opaque courts and party meetings by well connected, retired officials influencing their successors and as such there is little investment in rural people either judicially or the communities they live in.

Those families that go altogether to the cities do not escape the hardships and call of crime. Young boys and girls struggle to adapt to life in a metropolis and have to put up with the second class status they are loaded with as internal economic migrants. Many migrants are also non Han in ethnicity and as such have extra baggage that ultimately leaves them isolated and vulnerable to entering the criminal justice system.

There is however hope, economists point to household registration as a possible solution for these migrants.

Housing registration (Hukou) is the recognition of a migrant’s access to legitimate housing, schooling for offspring, welfare and other social benefits. Without a decent education such as the type children born to city dwellers get, the issues look set to go on and on. No registered housing also prevents judges giving probation to juvenile criminals. A systematic problem for Chinese justice.  Unregistered housing is in tenement blocks that can be pulled down and develop into Soweto style slums.

Improvements such as the increased transparency of local party meetings and decision making would foster justice and fairness and see young criminals get the support they need. Also, some investment in areas receiving money from development or central payments for the food/oil they produce for the East would arrest the rate at which the rural young enter the criminal justice system. Although a small consolation for no role models, it is a start.

In the city it is even simpler, Hukou for all migrants so safe housing, health care and good education means the conveyor of young Chinese being enticed into crime to get ahead in life will slow and stop.